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Rhode

New

England's economic resurgence of recent years.
economic malaise in 1982-84 resulted in a $250 million pro-

Island has not shared equally in

A

major reevaluation of the state 's
gram called the Greenhouse Compact to improve business in the state. Initially supported in
polls by a two-to-one margin, the Compact was defeated overwhelmingly when it went to a
statewide referendum. The timing of the referendum

and mistakes

in the

public relations strat-

of the Compact all played a role in the outcome, but postelection polls
showed that defeat, based on a massive shift of undecided voters, ultimately revolved around a
lack of trust in government and in the states leadership. Rhode Islanders made an understandable choice which unfortunately led to the loss of a great opportunity for the state.
egy and

in the structure

New

England has acquired a reputation as the glamorous new high
technology alternative to the Sun Belt. Massachusetts and Connecticut, in particular,
have seen an influx of businesses, jobs, and young, upwardly mobile executives pursuIn recent years,

ing fast-lane careers.

Not so Rhode

Island. Rather, the state has stagnated over the past decade, barely

replacing jobs lost in

Rhode

its

aging manufacturing base.

And

the jobs that remain

Island manufacturing wages the third lowest in the nation. Also,

lack of attractive

employment opportunities

for

its

make

owing to the

young people, Rhode Island has

the third highest proportion of people over age sixty-five of any state in the country;

educated youth are leaving for greener pastures.

its

Thus, as a Rhode Islander and a father,

embraced the opportunity in 1982 to
volunteer my time as a consultant to a special commission created for the purpose of
recommending ways to end Rhode Island's economic malaise. My job was to coordinate the research and writing of the commission's report.
The Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission (SDC) was composed of
nineteen members, with an advisory committee of another fifty members. The participants were drawn from business, finance, organized labor, higher education, public
service, and environmental advocacy. In addition, there was a staff of seventy people
who did the research and writing of the draft report (this group was formed and
directed by me). With the help of the advisory committee, the commission amended
the draft and came up with a document that met with their satisfaction.
I

president of Teles is, Inc., an international consulting firm that provides business strategy
consulting services for corporations and economic development consulting services for national governIra

Magaziner

is

ments, industry associations,

and

trade unions.

document was being written, pieces of it were circulated for assessment
among people who had expertise in the various topics such as taxation, environthat it evaluated. Approximately one hundred reviewers
mental issues, and so on
took part in this phase of the process. The final draft was composed by the seventyperson staff and the commission. All of this occurred between October 1982 and
October 1983. At the end of those twelve months, the report, known as the Greenhouse Compact, was introduced to the public. It was one thousand pages long and
contained a thorough analysis of the state's economy, along with a series of seventy
While

this

—

—

recommendations. All the participants
'

own

either volunteered their

and

secretaries

from

time

—

my company,

in the process that led to the final report

or, as

Telesis

was the case with consultants, researchers,
had their time volunteered for them by

—

their employers.

.

no two states are exactly the same in
their economic problems. The substance of the program developed not from any
ideology but from a pragmatic consideration of what would be required to make a
significant difference in the Rhode Island economy in the coming decade. In a state
not known for harmonious relations among business, government, and labor, the
achievement of a broad consensus among commission members on such a sweeping
program was viewed as a significant milestone.
Between October 1983 and March 1984, the report won endorsement from over
fifty leadership groups, including the state's Chambers of Commerce and its AFLCIO; the League of Cities and Towns (composed of mayors and town administrators); the presidents of all the universities and colleges in the state, as well as all the
college student councils; the Hospital Association of Rhode Island and the Rhode
Island State Nurses' Association; the Black Ministers Alliance; the Gray Panthers; the
Vietnam Era Veterans Association; and others.
In April 1984, the Greenhouse Compact passed both houses of the state legislature
81 to 7 in the House of Representatives and 36 to 13 in the
by substantial margins
Senate. (In Rhode Island, legislation must pass in both the state Senate and House
before being brought to the public in the form of a referendum.) The program won
bipartisan support from most political leaders in the state, including the Republican
and Democratic candidates for governor and the state's Republican and Democratic
U.S. senators. The commission then took the Compact to an all-or-nothing binding
referendum. The referendum wasn't essential for enactment of the program, since the
state treasury had a surplus that could have financed all of it; but it was important,
the commissioners felt, to engage Rhode Islanders in the process. Between mid
October 1983 and mid June 1984, commissioners volunteered their time to talk and
debate with voters in almost eight hundred meetings held around the state. Polls were
taken regularly to gauge public opinion, and up to the last three weeks before the
vote, they consistently gave the program a two-to-one favorable margin.
On June 12, 1984, Rhode Islanders went to the polls. The program was slaughtered.
The defeat of the Greenhouse Compact was an enormous disappointment to all of
us who had given two years of our time to the commission, but it didn't come as a
Just as no two businesses are exactly alike,

—

complete surprise. Events of the month prior to the referendum played a disproportionate role in the final determination. This article explains the Compact's defeat; but

before going into that,

I

will give a brief description

of the program's substance.

Q
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The Greenhouse Compact
After studying

Rhode

economic

Island's

status in depth, the individuals

on the

SDC

agreed that a major financial investment would be required to redress the cumulative

problems that had contributed to Rhode Island's stagnation. They found that over 60
percent of the state's manufacturing businesses were seriously threatened by foreign
competition;

The

it

was

clear that

trend, however,

was

were starting businesses
located in

50

Rhode

Rhode

in the

new products and new businesses.
opposite direction. Rhode Island entrepreneurs
Island needed

in other states,

and the substantial venture

capital firms

Island were lending out of state. State-based firms that were

expanding were creating more jobs outside Rhode Island than at home. Finally,
important research in several fields was being conducted in universities and hospitals
around the state, but Rhode Island businesses were not making use of it. In order to
reverse this pattern, the commission worked out a program of incentives to encourage
the development of new products and industries; to create an infrastructure for the
development of new products and industries; and to improve the general business
climate.

Of the

seventy recommendations that were made,

ones were as follows:

some of the more

significant

(1) the creation of research "greenhouses" to conduct applied

research in areas where

Rhode

Island universities and hospitals were already strong.

These would serve as a magnet for internal companies already working

in those areas

and would stimulate the creation of new companies in the state; (2) an incentive program to foster expansion of firms within the state; (3) a program to encourage Rhode
Island firms to share the risk of associated investments in order to pioneer

on

new prodfrom

ucts

and markets;

new

business start-ups; and (5) the granting of offsets against the state personal

(4) elimination of

all

capital gains taxes

profits received

income tax for entrepreneurs and investors. With respect to the general business
climate, the commission advised reform of the state unemployment and workers
compensation systems to reduce costs; establishment of a state office to cut red tape
in business regulation; and significant education and training programs to upgrade

Rhode Island population.
The Greenhouse Compact called for an investment

the skills of the

years

— $160 million in direct financing and the

nesses.

The goal was

rest in

of $250 million over seven

tax cuts and loans for busi-

to stimulate a total investment of $750 million over the seven-

The Compact was to be administered by an independent body consisting of nineteen members from the private sector and two
representatives from the legislature. The structure of this second commission would
parallel that of the original one, although the appointments made to it would be on a
year duration of the program.

rotating basis, with the term of service lasting one, two, or three years (a provision

was included for the reappointment of members). A paid staff would be hired about
two months after a positive referendum vote, and the new commission would contribute a significant effort in the first year and a half of its existence. But the new
commission would survive only as long as the program was in operation; it would act
as a board of directors and a catalyst for development, not as another permanent
layer of bureaucracy.

The Will of the Voters — An Overview

Two

polls

were taken by Peter D. Hart Research Associates,

Inc.,

of Washington,

D.C., to register voter attitudes toward the Compact. In December 1983,

how

they would cast their ballot

if

the election were held that day,

Rhode

when asked
Islanders

program by just under a two-to-one margin. In mid
March 1984, another Hart poll indicated a favorable vote by slightly more than a
two-to-one margin. (These majorities included pollees who said they would probably
vote for the Compact as well as those who expressed a definite intention to do so.
Ultimately, the fate of the program was in the hands of the "probables" and those
who were undecided.) In early June, however, a poll by Alpha Research Associates,
Inc., of Providence showed a negative result of 42 percent against the program, 34
indicated they

would vote

percent in favor of

it;

for the

but even those figures did not foreshadow the ultimate margin

of defeat.

Voting behavior

is

always complex and rarely lends

itself

—

to easy analysis.

Two

one by a team from Providence College and the other by
major postelection polls
Alpha Research Associates for a Brown University study team were conducted to
assess the results of the referendum. The thousands of phone calls made by Greenhouse supporters

in the

—

weeks preceding the election also provided some insight into

shifting voter dispositions. Finally, in seeking a deeper understanding

phone

calls

can provide,

I

have talked with

many

than polls or

people, both supporters and oppo-

nents of the Compact, since the election.

From
ers,

very early on, two distinct voter groups emerged: one of hard-core support-

the other of hard-core opponents. In the

December

1983 poll, 16 percent of

respondents said they definitely planned to vote yes; 12 percent registered a definite
intention to vote no. Supporters of the
the Greenhouse process; people

program included people who were

who were

close to people

who were

close to

close to the pro-

and others whose imagination had been captured by the possibility of actually
effecting a significant improvement in the state economy. On the other side were the
cess;

opponents. The Compact was a public program created to provide incentives for
industrial development,

agenda were

and those whose ideologies were

set in their intention to

vote against

it.

in conflict with this type of

This included a group on the

who opposed government intervention in the economy,
as well as a group on the left who opposed a so-called welfare program for business.
The former felt that labor had made inadequate concessions in the Compact; the latright of the political

spectrum

had conceded too much. The hard-core opposition also included
disenchantment had finally become alienated from government in the state, along with people who were fed up with taxes and saw the Compact as another tax program. Additionally, there was a small group of businessmen
who did not wish to see wages rise in the state (though of course their opposition was

ter felt that labor

people

who

after years of

never explicitly stated in these terms).

The figures for these two crystallized groups remained relatively stable, increasing
by only a few percentage points, to 21 percent in favor and 18 percent opposed, by
mid March 1984. Though they were responsible for much of the noise on both sides
of the debate and received most of the coverage by the news media, the program's

51
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vocal and confirmed proponents and opponents had

do with the actual outcome of the election. The most important group in this regard was the "silent majority," which represented 72 percent of voters in December 1983 and 61 percent in
March 1984. In December, 33 percent of this group listed themselves as probable yes
voters, 13 percent as probable no voters, and 26 percent as undecided. By March, the
figures had tilted even more in favor of the program: 39 percent were probable yes
voters, 12 percent were probable no voters, and 10 percent were undecided. Yet in the
end, virtually

all

to

of these people voted no.

toward the Compact had
been both positive and negative. Until May, the positive outweighed the negative for
the most part. By early June, the negative won out.
The prevailing view of the Compact disposed a majority of the swing group toward
a positive ballot. Conveyed in the polls and in conversations during the statewide
meetings, it can be summarized as follows: "The state has economic problems and

Throughout the

ry

little

some new

effort

is

year, the attitude of these swing voters

required to remedy the situation. These Greenhouse people and

seem to have put a lot of work into this program, and they appear to be
intelligent and honest. Maybe it will work; let's give it a shot." But the seed of defeat
for the Compact had been planted long before its initiation, then harvested over
many seasons of disappointment and disillusionment. Despite their inclination to vote
for the program, the swing group expressed a number of concerns, the substance of
which follows, that severely undermined their positive feelings: "This program
involves spending a lot of money and it's awfully complicated. In Rhode Island, you
can't trust that a program like this won't become politicized and result in the powerful giving out money to their friends and creating patronage jobs, or, worse, stealing
the people's money." In early polls, 65 percent of all voters said they agreed with the
statement that "there is too much political corruption in Rhode Island for a program
like the Qreenhouse to be administered honestly and effectively."
the governor

The Three Debates

The controversy over

the Greenhouse

Compact occurred on

three levels,

and the

postmortems that took place varied according to the perspective of the participant.
On the most superficial level, the debate centered on ideology, pitting advocates of
industrial policy or government intervention in the economy against supporters of
laissez-faire economics policies. Many reports in the national media posed the issues
within this framework; some academics interested in the national aspects of the
debate did likewise, as did some opponents of the Compact within Rhode Island. The
presentation of the debate in the national media was probably further influenced by
my presence as a consultant to the Greenhouse and my coauthorship with Robert
Reich of Minding America's Business, a book which advocates a U.S. industrial
policy. 2

National opponents of industrial policy
cases without

knowing much about

Island, lambasted the

Compact

it.

initially

many
Rhode

attacked the program, in

Arthur Laffer,

in a

speech

while admitting he had not read

made

it.

3

in

Forbes magazine

sent a reporter to write a news article about the program; instead, an editorial-style

piece appeared which ignored direct quotations

became an anti-Compact

diatribe.

from most business supporters and

4

After the April 1984 vote in the state legislature indicated that the referendum

—

would very likely pass, the national anti-industrial policy media switched gear and
downplayed the Compact, depicting it not as a bona fide industrial policy but as just
some specific programs created for a Rhode Island environment which in no way
could be used as a model for other, larger states or for the country as a whole. Yet
some of the same publications that had deemphasized the Compact's relevance following the legislative vote trumpeted the final defeat as a popular and representative
referendum which clearly demonstrated that the nation's people would hate any type
of industrial policy. 5
Actually, there were

who were

many members

of the Strategic Development

not in favor of a coherent national industrial policy.

A

Commission

majority of

Com-

community were most certainly President Reagan
supporters who would oppose such a policy and who would probably count themselves as conservatives whose views on many issues were parallel to those of the plan's
conservative opponents. The fact of the matter is that the Greenhouse Compact was a
program designed by about 250 people of diverse backgrounds and political views
whose priority was the formulation of a viable economic strategy for Rhode Island.
The average Rhode Islander and even the vast majority of people actively engaged in
a dialogue about the Compact didn't care a hill of beans about contentions over
pact proponents in the business

market imperfections or the efficiency of public/ private partnerideological argument was carried out on the news pages of the

industrial policy or
ships. Rather, this

Washington Post, on the

editorial

page of the Wall Street Journal, and

in a

few aca-

do with Rhode Island.
The second level of debate did take place in Rhode Island, and it revolved around
the specifics of the legislation that put forward the recommendations. Hundreds and
demic journals around the country.

It

had very

to

little

probably thousands of Rhode Islanders actively debated the specifics of the Compact

between October 1983 and April 1984

at public meetings,

through op-ed pieces

newspapers, and in the legislature. Besides the groups mentioned earlier

Chambers of Commerce,

state's

others, including the

Women,

the

ACLU,

the

AFL-CIO, and

the State Advisory

Community Labor

in the

— such as the

the Black Ministers Alliance

Commission on the Status of
number of businessmen, union

Coalition, and a large

members, and citizens of varied backgrounds voiced objections to particular aspects
of the program, made proposals for amendments, and argued in the legislature both
for and against many of the Compact's provisions. Hearings were held around the
state.

Various

legislative

committees were given different pieces of the program to

debate; groups and individuals (including legislators) filed opinions for proposed
modifications.

changes to the

The process was a healthy one, and the debate resulted in many
original proposals. Most of these changes, in my view, were improve-

ments.

At the end of
cisms they

still

this process,

many

may have had and

of the participants decided to overlook the

criti-

vote for the Compact. Some, feeling that their con-

cerns had not been sufficiently addressed, decided to vote against

it.

Those

legislators

who had been actively involved in the public debate decided in the end to vote for the
Compact. Though some of them were in fact against it and voted favorably only to
send

it

to a referendum, the margins of passage in April 1984, along with the individ-

ual conversations

we had with

passed in the state legislature

been voting

legislators,

—

in anticipation of a

albeit

convince

me

that the

by smaller margins

referendum.

Compact would have

— even

if

legislators

had not

^
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and the one that ultimately counted, was the debate before the
public. An intense discussion on the specifics of a program, when carried out in the
media and among those who surround the State House, can create the impression
that everyone in the state has a keen interest in what is being discussed. In fact, most
third debate,

do not stir the public into detailed discussion, and the Compact was no exception. For the majority of Rhode Island citizens, the ideological debates about industrial policy may as well have been taking place on the moon. Even the arguments
issues

over details were not really to the point. Very few

Rhode

Islanders voted for or

Compact because they thought

that the research greenhouse proposals
were not structured quite right or that the entrepreneurs' incentive programs were too
large or even that unemployment compensation proposals were too pro labor or too

against the

54

pro business.

postmortem discussions, and all the experiences
of the "campaign" indicate that for most voters, the decision about the Greenhouse
Compact ultimately revolved around the issue of trust.
The majority of voters felt that some course of action to improve the state's economy was needed and that public action was justified in support of economic development; the majority were even prepared to invest financially in these changes. During the first seven months following the Compact's release, most voters were prepared
to support it in the referendum even though they found it complex and had doubts
about its size, its financing (the tax and bonds), and its structure.
The explanation for voters' loss of trust in the Greenhouse process and therefore in
its ability to work lies in a combination of factors: flaws in the program's proposed
structure and financing; mistakes in the way it was presented to the public; and unrea fear set against the backdrop
lated events that raised the fear of public corruption
of public abuses which have marred Rhode Island's recent history. The public
response can be summarized by a slogan that emerged on radio talk shows during the
debate': "Clean house and then we will have a Greenhouse."
All the analysts of poll data,

all

the

—

The Mistakes
Voting

in a

referendum, as

many have

observed,

candidates in an election. People often have
candidates in a race, yet in most cases will

is

different

from voting

some misgivings about both

still

for political
political

vote for one of them. Since voting

machines do not record the degree of enthusiasm with which levers are pulled, it is
not possible to say how many votes were cast for candidate X merely because voters
disliked or distrusted candidate Y.

In a referendum,

on the other hand, misgivings lead people to vote no.

A

no vote

is

a safe vote.

The Substantive Errors
The commission that produced the Greenhouse Compact was appointed by the governor but had no legislative authority. For the purpose of administering the program,
a formally constituted legislative body was required. This second commission was to
consist of representatives from business, labor, academia, and the state legislature. It
was to receive almost all of its funding up front and have significant autonomy from
the legislative budgetary process. Although some legislative and executive oversight
was to be provided, the commission would be autonomous in most important
respects. The intention was to secure freedom from political influences that might be

exerted on a year-to-year basis, as well as to provide long-term continuity to the

administration of the program so that private-sector investors would feel they could
trust

ture

commitments made by the Greenhouse commission. Decisions about the strucof the new commission were influenced by the desire to assuage fears of political

influence. In retrospect, however,

it is

clear that the structure chosen did not have the

desired effect, and, in terms of engendering public support,

may

actually have been

the worst possible choice that could have been made. For the recent history of such

semi-autonomous bodies

A

number of quasi

in

Rhode

Island has only resulted in public distrust.

public bodies have been set

up over

Rhode Island
Some have become

the years in

to administer programs. Their history has been tainted, at best.

dumping grounds for political patronage; others have become hotbeds of corruption.
Over the past two years, a group of indictments resulted from a scandal involving the
staff of the Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation (RIHMFC),
which

is

responsible for administering low-interest federal mortgages in the state.

Prior to the advent of the Compact, the executive director of the

Rhode

Island Turn-

pike and Bridge Authority had been indicted on account of alleged extreme liberties

he had taken with his expense account. These are only two recent examples of the

checkered history of such

entities; there are

many more. 6

had volunteered our time to the SDC could not understand at first how
voters could distrust our motives, since we ourselves had done nothing to engender
distrust; but given the context in which we were working, such a response was quite
understandable. Many voters feared that the legislated commission would turn out to
be just another quasi public agency with large sums of money that would be
mishandled. Ironically, the action we took to mitigate this fear actually helped fuel it.
The second mistake we made was in regard to financing. The commission asked for
a one-time tax to fund a portion of the program and suggested that much of the
remainder be financed with bonds. The motivation for this was twofold: to keep
monetary decisions about the program separate from ongoing legislative decisions
about the funding of other programs; and to ask Rhode Islanders to make an explicit
sacrifice in order to fund the economic development of the state.
By the time the report was issued, the public was well aware that there was going
to be a substantial surplus in the state budget. An unpopular tax surcharge had been
levied in the previous year during the depths of the recession, and the recovery had
produced revenue surpluses in the state sales and income tax accounts. There was
enough money in the state treasury to fund the entire seven-year package. Even more:
as part of his budget message in 1984, the governor proposed a tax cut equal to $27
million per year while requesting the bond issue and one-time tax to fund the Compact. The cut was enacted, and by the end of that fiscal year, it became evident that
even further tax cuts were possible, and these also were enacted. A portion of the
state surplus could have been donated to the Compact with only legislative
approval
no one-time tax, no bond issue with associated interest payments, and no

We who

—

referendum.
In view of these facts, the commission's financial recommendations for the

pact seem politically naive. But

we

believed

it

was proper

to

Com-

go to the voters with the

program even though there was no requirement for this procedure; I still believe it
was unequivocally the right thing to do. We also felt strongly about keeping our
funding separate from the funding for other programs and agreed that a positive vote
on a one-time tax would provide a symbolic message to the nation that Rhode

jj
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on themselves in the interest of economic
development. Such a move, we thought, would send a clear signal to the outside
world about our commitment to turn around the state's anti-economic development
Islanders were prepared to impose a levy

image.

But again our good intentions boomeranged. The inclusion of the one-time tax

media about the Compact as a jobs program to debate about the
Compact as a tax program. Owing to the interest payments associated with the
bonds, the bond issue inflated the stated cost of the program, and it also incurred a
public outcry about banks supporting the Compact in order to obtain profits from
floating the bonds. In early polls, 65 percent of voters said that it was wrong for the
commission to ask for a one-time tax when the state government had a surplus,
Compact proponents made a third mistake when they tried to rush the referendum
election. Once more, the motives were good but the decision itself did not mesh with
the mood of the people. November 1984 would have been the obvious time to schedule the referendum election; a positive vote at this time would have meant ratification
of new commission members in early 1985 and a gearing up of commission activities
in the spring of 1985. But members of the SDC did not want to wait that long. The
investment upturn that had occurred across the country in the winter of 1983 and the
first half of 1984 was cause for optimism; however, the fear of a recession or at least a
slowdown of investment sometime in 1985 was shared by many. 7 Commission
members also feared that waiting until November would tie up the program in the
political issues of the 1984 elections. Anxious to avoid this circumstance and to ride
the investment boom, the SDC recommended a special election in February or
March 1984 to vote on the Compact. A special election was held, though not until
shifted debate in the

j^

June.

To a

move

seemed like an attempt to
railroad the program through. Both the suggested timing and the special-election
mechanism itself contributed to this impression and stimulated the fear that supporters would be able to bring out people and win on a small turnout.
suspicious public, the

for a special election

The Procedural Errors
Mistakes were also made in the presentation of the Compact to the public. Some mistakes were major, some were minor, but it all added up to a poor effort. For example, the program was introduced as a package
a compact among business, labor,
education, and government leaders who normally are at war with each other. The
purpose of this strategy was to preclude these groups from causing the whole program to unravel through efforts to delete elements not to their liking. To the public

—

perception, however, the package appeared to be an all-or-nothing, take-it-or-leave-it

proposition negotiated

among

elites,

with insufficient opportunity provided for modi-

by the people.
In fact, the SDC had always understood that changes would be made through citizen input in the legislative process, and it had scheduled the eight hundred statewide

fication

meetings to encourage such input. Unfortunately, the all-or-nothing image stuck with
the package, and so did the public resentment

it

engendered.

The commission had based its public-relations strategy on small-group meetings
around the state and on meetings with leadership groups to seek endorsements. The
idea of the small-group meetings came out of our feeling that the program was too
complex and too important to be reduced to thirty-second commercials; we wanted
to spend a few hours with voters at their clubs, churches, social

and professional

groups, unions, and so on. to discuss

it

in detail.

The meetings with leadership groups were organized on the assumption that people
who did not have the time or interest to study the program directly would be influenced by the opinions of those they had elected to various positions, whether in their
unions, their Chambers of Commerce, their State Nurses' Association, or other
groups.

As it turned out, both kinds of meetings, though necessary, were not in themselves
enough to influence passage of the referendum. A poll taken by the Providence College team in mid June 1984. after the referendum election, showed that only 6 percent
of those who voted had ever attended either type of meeting (though this was obscured by the fact that of those who did attend, many had gone to more than one
meeting). Further, when asked whether they were aware that leadership groups supported the Compact. 90 percent of respondents answered in the affirmative; but when
asked whether this support had influenced their vote, only 11 percent said it had
influenced them to vote positively. Sixty-nine percent said it had not affected their
vote at all; and 20 percent said that the support of the leadership groups had influenced them to vote negatively.
those which had the greatest
Perhaps the commission's biggest procedural errors
were made three weeks before the election, when the public was
effect ultimately
beginning to focus on the vote more directly. These errors had to do with the com-

—

—

mission appointments.

program would be administered by "political hacks"
and in order to initiate an open process, the governor and the legislative leadership
had promised to make known the names of commission appointees prior to the vote
so that people would know who their choices were. Through the enabling legislation,
the governor. House Speaker, and Senate majority leader (all Democrats) were to
share in the making of appointments to the new commission. Altogether, twenty-one
commissioners were to be appointed: nineteen from the private sector, and two legislators from the public sector (one from the Senate and one from the House). The
governor and legislative leaders conferred with the leaders of the original commission
about their decisions, and two issues emerged in these discussions: the representation
of women and minorities on the commission, and selection of the two legislators.
None of the appointees to the original commission had been members of minority
groups (though there was minority representation on the advisory committee), and
only two of the nineteen members had been women. The lack of representation had
brought on protest from these communities. Within the SDC, there were differences
of opinion on this issue. Some believed that women and minorities should be better
represented on the new commission; others were more concerned with regional mix,
with representation from various elements of the business community, and so on.
Discussion about selection of the two legislators centered on whether the House
Speaker and Senate majority leader, as the two most influential members of these
bodies, should appoint themselves to the new commission. Those in favor of this idea
believed that the self-appointments would demonstrate the importance that the legislature placed on the program; others thought the move would run the risk of politicizing the program in the minds of the voters.
I supported greater representation for women and minorities on the new commission as well as the appointments of the Speaker and majority leader. I lost the argument I should have won and won the argument I should have lost. Only three women
In order to allay fears that the
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commissioners and one minority commissioner were appointed, and the Speaker and
majority leader did appoint themselves. Announcement of these appointments created
a loud public protest that dominated television and newspaper coverage of the refer-

endum

most of the three weeks prior to the event. The State Advisory
Commission on the Status of Women and the Black Ministers Alliance eventually
endorsed the Compact and urged a yes vote, but the enthusiasm of their membership
waned, clearly from the lack of representation. The initial protests of these groups
election for

received front-page coverage, but their endorsements,

when

they came, went virtually

unreported.
That dispute had an unquestionably detrimental effect on the fate of the Compact,

but the real furor erupted over the two legislative appointments. The Republican

58

candidate for governor (now incumbent)

Edward DiPrete, who had

declared his sup-

port for the program, publicly denounced the self-appointments of the two
cratic legislative leaders

(who were

also supporters of the

Demo-

program) and demanded

and appoint one Republican in their stead. The controversy raged for
almost two weeks, with the Democratic legislative leaders refusing to bow to the
wishes of the Republican gubernatorial candidate.
Even when voters were unaware of the specifics of the feud, they knew that politi-

that they resign

cal

squabbling was engulfing the Compact. Phone

calls

made

to voters

by Compact

supporters during this time revealed a significant erosion of confidence, as people
reacted to

what they considered the

politicization of the entire undertaking.

It

was

would cause the program's defeat. A
compromise reached with the Republican and Democratic leadership established that
the Democratic Speaker and majority leader would be retained on the commission,
while the two Republican minority leaders would be added, thus increasing the membership of the commission by two seats.
But the agreement had the appearance of a political deal struck behind closed
doors, one that would merely expand the size of the group that would be administering $250 million; and it signified to the public that political deal-making and a willingness to bend the rules (the composition and size of the commission) would be as
typical of the body administering the Greenhouse Compact as it had been of many
previous bodies of the same type. So the last-ditch attempt to resolve the problem
only made it worse. Both sides finally agreed to support the compromise and go all
out to help secure passage of the referendum, but it was too late. The public debate
was over, but its effect on the people of Rhode Island had been devastating.
clear that continued publicity of this conflict

Other Problems
Our mistakes were
control.

intensified

by a

series of events

The mayor of Providence was

over which the commission had no

indicted and

removed from

office in the

months just before the referendum. 8 Indictments of three city officials in the Department of Public Works were made known on the day of the vote, with an announcement that one of them was to have been a referendum poll watcher that day. 9 In the
last weeks before the election, I made a number of speeches, particularly at senior
citizen centers, in support of the Compact. (Senior citizens made up an estimated 55
percent of the vote on the day of the referendum.) During the course of my talks, the
were
indictments
even though they were completely unrelated to the program
brought up repeatedly as evidence of why the Compact could not succeed.
By the time the vote was taken, many people were in no mood to approve large

—

—

sums of money

March Hart

by the

to be administered

state's

December and
and the unemployed

establishment. In the

had expressed the belief that children
would receive the most benefit from passage of the Greenhouse Compact. But a
majority of voters queried in exit polls by the Providence College pollsters said that
the greatest beneficiaries would be politicians and big business.
polls, voters

The organized ideological opponents of the Compact were active and highly visible
for the last six months of the effort, but they had little effect on the outcome; they
mostly were preaching to their own converts. It was the naivete and miscalculations
of the Compact's supporters, combined with the unhappy timing of unrelated events,
that in the end sounded the death knell for the Greenhouse Compact.
In retrospect,

A

made.

it is

raft of

hard to blame the people of Rhode Island for the judgment they

new

additional scandals involving broad sectors of the state's public

and private communities have emerged over the past eighteen months. 10 Some of
these scandals have centered around quasi public boards whose structure was similar
to that of the

SDC.

Those of us who were closely involved with the SDC were too immersed in it to
imagine that anyone could project onto our effort the kinds of problems that had
plagued other state endeavors. We also didn't realize that most people perceived the
entire undertaking as remote, hard to comprehend, and difficult to distinguish from
other less worthy activities, especially given the mistakes described earlier.

Even though I am fully convinced that the Compact, if enacted into law, would
have had a very positive effect on the state's economy, I can easily understand why
most people ultimately decided not to vote for it.

Two

questions have been asked frequently since the defeat of the program:

could people as successful as those

made
all

who worked on the Greenhouse Compact have
and, What would I do differently if I had it to do

over again?

Why

A

the mistakes described here?

How

the Mistakes?

year of intensive study had been required to formulate the recommendations that

Compact. In contrast, discussions about how to organize and
finance the commission and how to present the package to the public lasted less than

became
a

the Greenhouse

—

month in
Even more

hindsight, clearly too short a time.
to the point, almost

all

of the individuals

who worked on

the

Compact

were simultaneously performing full-time jobs as heads of companies or unions or

commission members had put an exhausting year
into the writing of the report, with an especially intense effort required in the four
months between July and October of 1983. Being relatively inexperienced in the public arena, we were simply not prepared for the tremendous demand that would be
made on our time during the nine months of public debate about the Compact.
Commission members attended about eight hundred public meetings; held numerous,
long sessions with legislators and with dozens of interest groups that were debating
the Compact; worked on writing and rewriting legislation; and held many strategy
institutions of education. All of the

sessions.

My own
pact's

business required

me

to

make many

promotion: four to the Far East,

five to

trips

during the months of the

Com-

Europe, two to Latin America, and

<-g
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numerous trips around the United States. I was forced to be absent for seventeen
days in May. The travel schedules of the commission chairman, the governor, and
myself prevented us from meeting together during the four weeks before the
appointments were made to the commission, which contributed to the mistakes made
in that process. In February, it had looked as though the election would be held in
early May, so we all postponed necessary travel until late May. No one foresaw that
the election would be in June, and that the end of May would become the most cruperiod of all, when public support unraveled.
These observations do not provide an excuse for the mistakes that were made, but

cial

they do go

some way toward explaining them. The Compact stirred up all the emocampaign or perhaps more and the situation was further com-

—

tions of a political

60

—

plicated by the fact that positions were spelled out in minute detail instead of being

A

normal campaign is
candidates and staff. We were part-

painted with the broad brush strokes of the usual campaign.

hard enough, even when conducted by full-time
time amateurs.

Lessons to Be Learned
After the defeat of the Greenhouse Compact,

other states, most of

whom

I

talked with a

number of

officials in

suggested that the program was far too complex to have

gone to a referendum. They said that any need for a referendum had been disposed of
by the program's success in uniting a disparate and wide range of leadership groups
in a normally divided state, and by its passage in the state legislature by significant

would have been considered extraordinary accomplishments, and the program would have won the hearts of the people
majorities; these things alone, in their opinion,

as they experienced

While

I

its

beneficial effects over the years.

understand the pragmatism embodied in their comments,

I

do not

agree.

I

any program as far-reaching as the Greenhouse Compact should be put
to the people for approval as a matter of principle. Further, in my judgment the program could have succeeded at the polls had we proceeded differently with it:
believe that

The Compact should have been brought

to the public as a draft, not as a fait

accompli, and the public meetings should have been overtly designed as a forum
for

amending the proposals.

The

election should have been held in

November

rushing the process, and voters wouldn't have

felt

1984; this

would have avoided

they were being pressured.

The financing for the program should have been requested incrementally over the
life of the Compact, with some means of guaranteeing its continuity; this would
have eliminated the necessity of forcing people to vote for all the funds up front.

More checks and

balances and more legislative oversight should have been built

program

into the administrative structure of the

to ensure that

it

would be admin-

istered meritoriously.

The

SDC

should have been

Communication with

made more

representative of

all

the public at large should have been

Rhode

Islanders.

more comprehensive.

almost impossible to enact a program of very broad significance unless citizens have a certain basic level of trust in their government, and
In the final analysis,

it is

the deep-seated suspicion of corruption

and patronage

in the state did

not lay a good

foundation for the Greenhouse Compact. Nevertheless,

May

polls

Rhode
still

am

Rhode

if

the December, March, and

were accurate, the program might well have succeeded with the voters of

Island had

it

not been marred by the fatal flaws discussed in this

convinced that

it

would have made an overwhelming

article.

And

I

positive difference to

Island's future.

moment

Perhaps the most poignant

before the vote, on Sunday, June

of our two years of

work occurred two days

10.

Most people who had been closely involved with the Compact knew by then that it
would be defeated. But their dedication was still strong, and they decided on the Friday preceding the referendum that they would exert one last effort to show the people
of Rhode Island the depth of feeling that supported the Compact and the unlikely
alliances that had formed to propose it.
On one day's notice, leaders of the fifty or so groups that had endorsed the Compact were asked to come to a march in support of it. The architects of the procession
had drawn up a plan for about one hundred people to march five miles from Slater
Mill in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the birthplace of the U.S. industrial revolution and
the town where the Compact legislation had been signed, to the Roger Williams
Monument in Providence, the site of the founding of Rhode Island and the city
where the Compact had been unveiled. Despite the short notice and despite the 105
degree heat, not one person who had been asked to participate and who was in town
that day failed to march. A few people
such as Father Thomas R. Peterson, the
highly respected president of Providence College
even flew back from out of town

—

—

to take part.

Because of the heat, the

streets

were deserted. The procession must have offered a

Chambers of Commerce
most successful businesses marched

curious sight in this decade of the eighties. Heads of the

movement in the state and of some of the state's
arm in arm with labor leaders, college presidents, and U.S. Senator Pell; and with
leaders of the Rhode Island State Nurses' Association; the Rhode Island Association
of Realtors; the Black Ministers Alliance; high school and college student council

Mayors; the State Hospital Association; the state
chapter of Vietnam Veterans; the State Advisory Commission on the Status of
Women; and dozens of other groups. Even elderly representatives of the state's Association of Retired People and the Gray Panthers marched part of the way (they alternated walking time with a bus ride that was provided for them).
associations; the Association of

The march was

though nearly everyone knew it was no longer
The media coverage of the event symbolized the futility
to communicate. Two of the three local television sta-

high-spirited, even

possible to influence the vote.

of the effort and the failure
tions,

having been notified very

late, failed

altogether to report the march.

An

inter-

miscommunication led the third station to believe that the march would begin,
not end, at the Roger Williams Monument. That night, on its 6 P.M. news broadcast,
the station reported that a group of Compact supporters, looking very tired, had
nal

gathered at the

monument

for five minutes, and, having decided not to hold their

march, had boarded some buses and

left.

The commentator, who was

totally

unaware

march had taken place, related the story in disgust. A headline the following
morning in the Providence Journal declared, "Greenhouse supporters brave heat
while public cools to the Compact."

that a
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The Aftermath
Greenhouse Compact are the positive relationships that were established among so many of the state's leaders and the common
understanding that has emerged about the state's problems and their solutions. Pieces
of the Compact have already been implemented in Rhode Island since the referendum, and other pieces are likely to be implemented over time. In addition, officials in
many other states have studied the program and have been influenced by parts of it in

The most important

their

62

own

residual effects of the

policy planning.

The people who worked on the Compact all had successful careers that continued
after it was defeated. None of them received any financial benefit from the Compact,
and none of them would have received such benefit had it been enacted into law. The
defeat of the Compact did not unfavorably affect their professional lives. Rather, for
those who participated, the pain of the defeat resulted from a strong feeling that
Rhode Island had missed a great opportunity. And it was our strong feelings about
Rhode Island and its people which had led us to initiate the effort in the first place.
Like the football player

who

is

used to being successful but

who

causes his team to

an important game by dropping some crucial passes, we have only ourselves to
Rhode Island made an understandable choice, given
the circumstances of the state and the way the Compact was structured and presented
to them. That is what is so disappointing.
Despite this, positive changes have already materialized in Rhode Island because of
lose

blame, ultimately. The people of

and more changes are forthcoming. For this reason, and because the goals
were right, I do not regret the Greenhouse Compact.
our

effort,
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Fizzles

on Launch:

Islanders,"

A probe was begun

in April 1982 concerning the expense account activities of James Canning,
Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority. Charges were brought against him in
April 1983 and he was ordered to trial in May 1984, but owing to his poor health, the trial was
delayed until January 1985. George Marshall was a former state representative and a chief security officer of the adjudication division of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation. He was
charged with corruption on 30 June 1984 and was indicted for a ticket-fixing scheme along with
Thomas Reilly, an auto emissions control inspector. Ralph A. Pari, executive director of the
Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation (RIHMFC), was indicted on 7

director of the

December 1985 on various charges; Robert
December 1985.

J.

DeCesaris, legal counsel for RIHMFC,

was

in-

dicted on 31
7.

8.

Data Resources, Inc., of Lexington, Massachusetts, and Chase Econometrics of New York City
were among the forecasters of an economic slowdown in 1985; both companies issued reports
in 1983-84 citing evidence for their predictions.

Mayor Vincent

He was originally charged
and extortion in relation to reprisals against his wife's
He was convicted of one count of felonious assault and received a five-year

A. Cianci,

Jr.,

resigned from office on 25 April 1984.

with six counts of assault, kidnapping,

alleged boyfriend.

sentence. Shortly after his forced resignation, Cianci declared his intention to
resignation had vacated.

He was

fill

the seat his

prevented from so doing by the Rhode Island State Supreme

Court.
9.

10.

highway superintendent, was indicted on 18 April 1984
on extortion charges; on 11 June 1984, he was charged with bribery, conspiring to commit bribery, embezzlement, and conspiring to embezzle. He had been slated to be a poll watcher for the
Compact referendum. Edward T. Marfeo, an employee of the Department of Public Works under
Melise, was charged with aiding and abetting bribery, conspiring to commit bribery, and conspiring to embezzle. In a related matter, another DPW employee, Palmino Vecchio, was charged with
one count of assault and one count of intimidating a witness.

Edward "Buckles"

On

14

November

indicted

in

the

Melise, Providence city

1984, the Providence Journal

RIHMFC and Department

added the following names

of Transportation scandals:

to the

list

of

those

Robert D. Murray, former

Governor Edward DiPrete, was charged with obtaining money under false pretenses and filing a false document to obtain his low-interest RIHMFC loan; he pleaded innocent
in Rhode Island Superior Court on 13 November 1985. Harry R. Speight, a Rhode Island state
trooper who served as driver both for Governor DiPrete and former governor J. Joseph Garrahy,
was charged with one count of conspiring to obtain money under false pretenses and one count
chief of staff for

of conspiring to

file

a false document

in

connection with his

RIHMFC

mortgage. Helen O'Donnell,

vice president of Fleet National Bank's mortgage department, and Lois Martin, a Fleet National

Bank mortgage officer, were charged in the alleged conspiracy with Harry R. Speight; the two
bankers were also charged together on a third count of filing a false document. John E. Corrigan,
the former chief financial officer of RIHMFC, was charged with three counts of obtaining money,
goods, and property under false pretenses from RIHMFC. Gwendolyn

management

was

Rotelli,

a former

RIHMFC

she allegedly
took with RIHMFC executive director Ralph Pari at agency expense. Anthony Saccucci was a
Department of Transportation engineer on the Pawtucket Route 95 S-curve project; he was
charged with conspiring to obtain money under false pretenses and with obtaining money under
false pretenses. James Forte, vice president of Forte Bros. Construction Co., and Vincent DeQuattro, Forte's administrative assistant, were each indicted on one count of obtaining more than
$500 under false pretenses and one count of conspiring to obtain money under false pretenses
in connection with overcharges paid by the state Department of Transportation on the Route 95
S-curve project in Pawtucket. William Cimini and Angelo Landi, the former an officer and the latter an employee of Highway Safety Ltd., were charged with obtaining money under false pretenses and conspiring to obtain money under false pretenses. All of the above faced charges in
court on 13 November 1985.
property

analyst,

indicted in connection with pleasure trips that

63

New England Journal of Public

Policy

1986

The Next Step

Regionalism:

Ian Menzies

64
Although the New England states have, over the years, been regionally cooperative, they have
not formally advanced the process since the establishment of the New England Governors'
Conference in 1937. There is still no regional government in New England; no body politic that
can enact regionwide laws; no organization authorized to perform regionwide planning, or with

power

growth and development or manage natural resources. There
isn't even a public forum or assembly where such issues can be discussed. This article reviews
the history of regionalism in New England and proposes that the six states develop a more
the

to regulate or direct

mature approach

to

complex regional

issues

by forming a

New England

Council of

Governments.

Calvin Coolidge, as far as I'm aware, never said

he never said

much about

much about

regionalism.

Some

say

anything, but he understood very well the spirit of recalci-

embodied in the New England psyche, which, on occasion, he
reflected with a wry wit. For example, we have the story of the day Coolidge and
some companions were standing beside a bridle path in Montpelier. A state senator
who never agreed with anyone or anything happened to ride by. Said Coolidge, turning to his friends: "Must bother him to be going the same way as the horse."
Contrariness, a New England characteristic intimately familiar to the Yankee Coolidge, has, over the years, taken many forms, among them a disinclination by the six
New England states toward any extended degree of regional cooperation. Although
formal efforts to promote regionalism in New England go back some fifty years,
overall results have been less than distinguished. And, curiously, little has been done
to review or evaluate those efforts with an aim toward overcoming limitations
through an improved process.
Yet how can New England continue to enjoy both prosperity and livability without
a far more effective, systematized regional approach to growth, planning, increasing
densities, pollution, transportation, conservation of natural resources, and the internal distribution of people, services, and jobs? But first, it would be helpful to agree on
what is meant by regionalism, that is, as the term applies to a group of states rather
trance and contrariness

than to divisions within a single

Throughout

this article,

state.

regionalism

is

considered a positive thing.

It is

simply as the concept that those states which share a geographic identity

Ian Menzies
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a former managing editor

columnist from 1970 to 1985.
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and associate

editor of the Boston Globe,

a senior fellow at the John

McCormack
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share certain economic, social, cultural, and political characteristics which, through

cooperation, they can exploit to their mutual benefit.

It is

also reasonable to say that

New

England states do form a fairly natural homogeneous grouping; that as a
whole this fact has been accepted by New Englanders; that efforts to think and act
regionally have improved in recent years; but that despite this progress there is, as
the six

yet,

no formalized regional agenda, assembly, or

legislative process.

One would think that the need to formalize the
evident. More self-evident, however, has been the
states;

regional process

would be

lack of cooperation

self-

among

a lack of cooperation that at times has devolved into bizarre bickering.

the

Some

may remember the Battle of the Bottle back in the late 1950s, when Bay State tax
men would spy on New Hampshire's tax-free liquor stores, identify Massachusetts
buyers through the use of binoculars and hand signals, then nail Bay Staters for

unpaid liquor taxes as they reentered their home

Updated versions of this
border tax war continue. Recently Massachusetts revenuers went after big-ticket hard
goods dealers who have warehouses in Massachusetts but retail outlets in New
Hampshire, where, free of a sales tax, they can undersell their Massachusetts
state.

competition.

New England states for
also
have
caused
friction, because some
and
not
just
sales
taxes.
Income
taxes
years,
states have them (Massachusetts and Rhode Island), while others don't (New Hampshire and Connecticut). The result, according to the Massachusetts Department of
Revenue, is that some Bay Staters who live along the border but work in Connecticut
or New Hampshire have avoided paying taxes to their home state, an evasion unfair
to their fellow citizens. That evasion, however, may now end, or at least be reduced,
as early this year tax officials of nine Northeastern states agreed to compare their
computer files in an effort to track down tax cheats
a good illustration of voluntary
Taxes, indeed, have been a major aggravation between the

—

regional cooperation.

But there are
teristic that

still

some

many

call

unnecessary conflicts fed by that old

rugged individualism and others

New

England charac-

call illogical contrarinesss.

do the New England states still have different rules and regulations
and selling of certain shellfish? Why different legal lengths for flounder,
cod, and haddock? And the variation in mesh size from state to state is not conducive
to the preservation of immature fish. Positive steps were taken in 1984 to standardize
minimal lengths for lobsters, soft-shell clams, and striped bass, but more has to be

Why,

for instance,

for the taking

done, especially in the interests of conserving overfished species, such as the food-

important black-back flounder. Surely the rules governing the taking of
fish,

fish

and

shell-

inshore and offshore, should be the same.

been much the same with the drinking age, with one state setting it at eighteen,
another at nineteen, and yet another at twenty-one. The outcome was predictable.
It's

Thousands of teenagers, seeking drinking legality, simply drove across borders, thus
increasing the risk of highway tragedy. Not until quite recently, pressured by the
campaign of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), did the New England states
make a serious regional effort to agree on a uniform drinking age of twenty-one.
Vermont, however, as of late 1985, was still a holdout, with the Boston Globe reporting thousands of young people flocking into Vermont on weekends to drink or buy
beer or liquor, or do both. Vermont is finally expected to fall into line with the other
New England states this year under pressure from the federal highway administration,
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which has threatened to withhold highway funds from
drinking age to twenty-one by October 1986.

New England

states that fail to raise the

also has failed miserably in maintaining, let alone improving, inter-

where the need for collaboration and a united front is a prerequisite.
Think, for instance, how airline congestion could be eased both in Boston and New
York with the alternative of fast rail. New bullet trains wouldn't be necessary. What
needed is completion of rail electrification between New Haven and Boston, along
with some new track, plus track straightening, completion of an updated signal sysstate transit,

tem, and, perhaps as
length of the

ton and

^

line,

much

as anything, a single routing authority

which would permit three-hour

downtown New York,

travel time

is

throughout the

between downtown Bos-

thus providing a service that would be comparable to

current fast Metroliner service between

New York and

Washington. As of today

looks as though Montreal's far-sighted, big-project mayor, Jean Drapeau,

may

it

suc-

promote three-hour fast rail between Montreal and New York before we
here in New England have three-hour rail between Boston and New York, even
though the distance from New York to Montreal is two hundred miles farther.
Fast rail between Boston and New York is the only way to reduce steadily worsening delays at Boston's Logan Airport, both in the air and on the ground. Logan's
multiplying problems, which, if allowed to continue, could eventually force a more
cessfully

1

distant relocation of the airport, are directly tied to the fact that the Boston-to-New-

volume of 4.4 million
passengers annually. Despite this, the New England states haven't done nearly enough
to push for a competitive transit alternative to the New York shuttle. Yet a business
person, using three-hour rail, could, on many days, make it from downtown Boston
to New York faster than taking the shuttle would permit, a situation that will worsen
with mounting need for greater airport security.
There is also a major need, especially in the northern half of New England, to restore passenger rail to and through Boston to the south. In the densifying Northeast
corridor, the future for buses and cars will worsen, the result of mounting gridlock in
and around the region's cities. We are running out of capacity on our highways as
well as space to park at journey's end. Obviously New England should stop thinking
highways, even air, and instead think fast rail for both people and freight, thus preserving airports for national and international travel. Fast rail is a regional challenge
that has been sidetracked by the New England congressional delegation, governors,
and state legislatures ever since it was derailed by the governor of Connecticut in 1971
because the proposed track realignment would have bypassed several coastal communities then, and still, receiving service. And the way not to go, yet the way we're
going, is to build ever longer and heavier trucks (already up to fifty tons), along with
smaller and smaller cars
a suicidal policy. The day when entire families (five or six
people at a time) can be wiped out is already upon us.
Collective advances have been made on long-range power needs, some involving
Canada, as well as on the need to protect groundwater, which doesn't observe state
have
including badgering the Reagan administration
lines. And positive steps
been taken by the governors to find a compromise solution to the deadly dangers of
acid rain. But virtually no progress has been made in selecting a regional site or sites

York

air

corridor

is

the busiest in the nation, with an incredible

—
—

—

for disposal of low-level nuclear waste,

volume per capita than any other

which

region.

New

England produces

in greater

—

The picture is clear. There is no formal regionalism, with a couple of exceptions.
Most of what happens results from a handshake between the New England governors, or, as in the case of acid rain, because the issue beats on the heads of New Engenders and kills the fish in their ponds and the trees in their forests. There are, it's
true, literally scores of organizations that

have

New

England-wide

interests in special

areas such as conservation, preservation, energy, medicine, water, and business, but
in the final analysis, in seeking regional unification,

such organizations can operate

only on a state-by-state basis.

no regional government in New England; no body politic that can enact
regionwide laws; no organization authorized to perform regionwide planning or with
the power to regulate and/ or direct growth and development or manage natural
resources. There isn't even a public forum or assembly where such issues can be discussed; where a consensus and constituency for regional proposals could be developed and an agenda generated. Instead what we have are special-interest regional
organizations, which, through congressionally approved compacts between two or
more of the New England states, have been delegated powers to form interstate
agreements. Existing compacts currently cover such areas as higher education, public
safety, flood control, and prisons.
The best known and perhaps most beneficial of these compacts is the one which, in
1955, established the New England Board of Higher Education and which was ratified by all six states and the U.S. Congress. It is the purpose of the board to advance,
develop, and direct programs and activities that increase higher educational opportunities and that improve efficiency in the use of resources among New England's
academic institutions. 2 Since 1957, the board's Regional Student Program has made it
possible for more than fifty thousand New England students to attend out-of-state
public colleges and universities in the region at reduced tuition rates for specialized
degree programs not offered by in-state public institutions. Through this program, for
instance, a student in Maine, a state without a medical school, can attend one of the
New England state universities that has a medical school, at considerable savings over
private school costs. Currently, some five thousand students, each realizing an averThere

is

age tuition savings of more than $2,000, are enrolled in this regional program.
the largest such
It

would be

program

foolish,

It is

in the nation.

however, to take the board's continued existence for granted.

In 1982 Connecticut threatened to pull out of the

compact

— ostensibly to cut costs

but Governor William A. O'Neill strongly supported continuation, pointing out that

"More, not

less,

regional collaboration

knowledge-intensive economy.

.

.

.

is

Board

needed

in behalf of

New

services link the research

England's growing

and manpower

economic development."3
The New England Board of Higher Education, headed by John C. Hoy, best
represents the type of effective, publicly beneficial organization that can be produced
by, as well as serve, regionalism. Its limitation is that it deals with only one facet of
New England life, albeit a critically important one: education. In fact, however, the
board has interpreted its mission of education liberally, and, quite sensibly, as the
only broad-based regional organization around, has expanded its activities to
regional economic studies such as job training and the New England economy per se.
It doesn't have to seek far for justification. Higher education is one of the most
important industries in New England. The annual expenditure of the region's 260 col-

training capabilities of higher education to

,_

—
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leges

and

universities

in revenues,

way

is

which

is
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approximately $4

billion,

and they generate about $10

billion

close to 8 percent of the gross regional product. Currently under

a two-year study of the region's nine medical schools and teaching hospital

centers which aims to evaluate their role in the regional

economy and their imporThe study is

tance to the region's developing biomedical, biotechnical industries.

being chaired by Dr. James

M. Howell,

senior vice president and chief economist of

Bank of Boston who, although a Texan, knows more about the New England
economy than anyone else. In his view, the importance of these nine academic
the

regional health centers

New

England.

One
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is

absolutely pivotal to the long-term competitive strength of

4

other effective regional organization, although in the private rather than pub-

New

England Council, which is made up of 1,200 member firms
banks, manufacturing companies, utilities, and so on
and employs over 1 million
New Englanders. Over the years, the council has both contributed to a positive
investment climate in New England and encouraged general economic growth.
Although self-interest lobbying hasn't always endeared it to liberals, the council has
taken broader stands as, for instance, in 1982, when it sought to set up a New England Assembly, a sort of Aspen Institute-type think tank to focus on New England
issues. Curiously, to outsiders at least, the New England Council and the Massachusetts High Technology Council, representing 150 member firms with 240,000
employees
have not seen fit to collaborate. The
130,000 of them in Massachusetts
High Tech Council, the newer group, obviously feels its interests are best served
through independent representation and, as of now, on a nonregional basis.
This brings us to the two umbrella political organizations which currently offer the
only forums in which to discuss and act, in a limited sense, on a broad spectrum of
regional issues. One is the New England Governors' Conference, established in 1937,
and the other is the much lesser known, more recent Caucus of New England State
Legislatures, formed in 1978. The Governors' Conference, which meets four times a
year, has a most competent but small staff of fifteen, headed by William Gildea, and
a current annual budget of $858,000 (based on $75,000 per state plus a per capita
contribution). The conference staff, based in Boston, does draw on various state
agencies throughout the region for help in research and analysis.
Areas of interest currently under discussion by the governors include energy, fish
(the boundary dispute with Canada on Georges Bank), acid rain, groundwater, lowand high-level nuclear waste, and interstate banking. In addition to their four meetings a year, the governors of the six New England states meet with the governors of
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania in an enlarged group known as CONEG
(Coalition of Northeast Governors). The New Englanders also meet with the premiers
lic

sector,

is

the

—

—

—

of Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces

Edward

—

— New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince

and Newfoundland
thus extending their interests and concerns to
New England itself. Energy and fish have been the prinmeetings with the Canadian premiers. Groundwater was the subject of

Island,

the north, south, and west of
cipal topics at

CONEG

August 1985, at which time the Northeast governors
urged the federal government not to cut back on waste-water treatment projects and
also urged it to set national standards for drinking water. At one of their meetings in
Springfield last fall, the New England governors learned, to their immense satisfaction, that the Reagan administration had finally admitted the governors were right

the last

meeting

in

about acid

rain, that, indeed,

it is

formed by sulphates and that those sulphates

should, as far as possible, be eliminated.

However, the Governors' Conference, while showing a growing effectiveness, still
remains a policy-proposing rather than a law-making body. The conference's limitations are obvious. Little can be achieved unless

all six

governors agree; even then, the

governors cannot pass any laws or allocate any funds. As

in their

own

states,

they can

up to the individual legislatures to dispose. The governors can and
do have an impact on setting policy, but the process, almost literally, is a handshake
only propose.

It is

operation.

Nor would

New

England be complete without reference to two additional organizations which, though now defunct, did play a role in its
advancement and which could, I suppose, like the phoenix, return reborn. The first
was the New England Regional Commission, spawned by President Johnson's Great
Society, one of eight federally sponsored agencies commissioned to revitalize areas
the history of regionalism in

from a lack of economic development. Of the eight agencies, first estabstruggles on, underfunded.
the Appalachia Commission
lished in 1967, only one
At the same time, the feds also established the New England River Basins Commission under the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, its mission to plan for and
suffering

—

—

conserve water resources.

The New England Regional Commission was jinxed from the start, deadened by an
By 1972 it had become the subject of a newspaper

excess of political appointments.

probe by the Boston Globe, which, among other things, described

it

as a "do-nothing

bureaucracy squandering millions of dollars in bookshelf studies." Before the com5

mission went out of business, however, a
staff

produced a

New

much more improved, more

professional

England Regional Plan and Economic Development Strategy

was substantive and that deserved implementation. The River Basins Commisopposed to the Regional Commission, worked smoothly and more professionally from the start and contributed a great deal to a New England-wide awareness of the need to conserve water resources. It was an agency that, had it continued,
would have been more appreciated now than then. It was ahead of its time, which is
ideal for planning purposes but not from a political point of view. The agency withered from lack of public and, in turn, congressional support.
President Carter, who, while governor of Georgia, had been at odds with the leadership of the Georgia Regional Commission, in presenting his final presidential
budget declined to fund any of the nation's regional commissions. Appalachia was
excepted. The cuts were sustained by President Reagan. When the two New England
commissions died in 1981, the New England governors, wisely, approved the transfer
of staffers from the successful River Basins Commission to the Governors' Conference. Thus ended a well-intentioned national effort at regionalism, as well as some $8
million annually in federal funds which had been allocated to the two New England
that

sion, as

commissions.
So, what we're

left

with

is

the Governors' Conference and the

land-wide influence. But neither has

legislative authority.

What

is

needed today

breakthrough; an advance to a new plateau; a next step in regionalism.
it

New EngNew Eng-

Caucus of

land State Legislatures as the only two agencies with even a semblance of

is

a

What should

be?

This

is

an opportune time to think regionalism.

New

England

is

flying high.

The
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National Planning Association predicts substantial population gains for both

New

—

Hampshire and Massachusetts between now and the year 2000 a gain of 560,000
for Massachusetts and 373,000 for New Hampshire. And, according to the U.S.
Commerce Department, New England is today the richest region in the nation, with a
per capita average income of $14,421. Surely this is the time to plan a strategy that
will maintain the region's gains, conserve resources, and lessen the pockets of poverty,
whether rural, as in some of the sparsely populated northern counties, or urban, as in
cities like Hartford, Providence, New Haven, Boston, Lewiston, Springfield, and
Nashua. There is an enormous need for a New England-wide job training program
that can meet the changing demands of the region, from shoes and cotton to high
tech and biotechnology; a job training program that would develop a mobile work
force prepared to

70

move

to wherever jobs in the region arose. There

regional job fluidity, something that a

taught as a

norm

is

a need for

new generation of schoolchildren should be

so as to avoid depressed cities and communities.

Equally important

is

the need to

expand agriculture

in

New

England, utilizing

greenhouses to extend the vegetable growing season while selectively reordering priorthe breeding of farm animals.

New

England imports nearly 90 percent of its
produce, 80 percent from California. There is a market here for fresher, tastier, less
artificially preserved foodstuffs and the technology to grow it year round, but a strat-

ities in

egy supported by

all six states will

be required to ensure effective marketing. With

water problems in the West, which could cut production and raise prices,

it

would

make sense for New England to become more self-sufficient in agricultural products.
The handling and marketing of New England's fresh-fish catch could also stand
improvement, and with new technology promising added shelf life, more fresh fish
could be exported to the Midwest, thus adding to the value of this industry.

would make
sense to consider a public-private, independent regional authority to contract for and
build such housing (at volume cost savings) under a standardized, realistic building
code, especially as the federal government is distancing itself more and more from
subsidized housing. And the New England states also face an urgent need to designate sites for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, making use of whatever political trade-offs are required. New England, a major producer of low-level radioactive waste, may soon find there is nowhere to put it, unless at prohibitive cost.
New England could obviously benefit from a more formal approach to regionalism, but to reach that next plateau will require that (1) a regional assembly or forum
be established, where issues can be debated publicly and constituencies formed to
support those issues; and (2) a political process be put in place which is capable of
producing, where appropriate, regional legislation.
Assemblies have been proposed before. In 1974, economist Rudolph Hardy, speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., proposed a New England
Assembly with the power to conduct regionwide planning. In 1981, following the termination of the two New England federal commissions, Hardy again proposed an
assembly at a special meeting of government, public, and private-industry officials
held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. His proposal failed to attract support.
An even earlier proposal for a New England-type Tennessee Valley (TVA) authority
was made by a regional planning committee at Yale University but also got nowhere.
Perhaps, using these failed proposals as a measurement, the soundest and safest

With a

critical

shortage of low- and low-middle-income housing,

approach would be to expand on machinery already

in

it

place by forming a

New

Eng-

The council could be an enlargement of the present
Legislatures, formed in 1978, which is made up of

land Council of Governments.

Caucus of

New England

those persons
state. In

who

State

hold the six legislative leadership positions in each

New

England

addition to the six legislative leaders from each state, additional legislators

could be appointed on a per capita state basis so as to form a broadly representative
regional

body of eighty

to

one hundred members.

This expanded Council of Governments would consider proposals, in the form of

forward by the proposed public assembly (a nonlegislative body), by
the Governors' Conference, and from the council's own initiatives. The council would
sit in session, in rotation, at each of the six State Houses for a fixed number of days
legislation, put

annually and would act on any proposed legislation.

Bills that

were approved would

be sent to the individual legislatures for consideration, where their chance of passage

would be

greatly

enhanced because of prior approval by the regional body represent-

ing the legislative leadership of

all six states.

would provide a heretofore nonexistent system of enacting regional legislation with greater speed and
regionwide understanding, both public and political. And, just as important, it would
provide a centerpiece where regional issues could be discussed and acted on. Furthermore, there is no question that a meeting of the region's legislative leadership, on
a circuit-riding basis, would attract media attention, something sadly lacking up to
This process would not encroach on states' rights, and

this

time in regional

it

affairs.

Endorsing the concept of more active participation by the

New

England

tures as a means to more effective
James Howell commented that the sooner we understand the need

legisla-

regionalism, something he has long endorsed, Dr.

tion, the

sooner we're going to be able to assure the long-term

Equally significant, however, would

for this participa-

vitality of the region. 6

be the need for a grassroots public assembly

still

on a rotating basis, although at different
times from the Council of Governments (legislatures). The Governors' Conference
that could meet annually or biannually, also

could maintain
its

its

present schedule of four meetings a year but perhaps hold one of

meetings in conjunction with the council in order to maximize and centralize dis-

cussion of proposed regional legislation.

Andrew Card, Jr., the president's White
asked him how the Reagan administration would react

In a conversation in August 1985 with

House

assistant to the states,

I

to a stronger regional presence.

"We would encourage

it,"

he said, although by

"encourage" he was not suggesting a revival of the once federally funded regional
commissions. Card, who, because of

his liaison

with the

states,

is

in a better position

than most to evaluate regionalism, says that the South has used the regional concept
to greater advantage than

any other part of the country, adding, however, that

England has one of the strongest cases for regionalism of
Shouldn't that case be tried

.

.

.

now?

It's

all.

New

7

time for the next step.
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